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SUMMARY
Can we forecast the probability of an arbitrary sequence of events happening
so that the stated probability of an event happening is close to its empirical
probability? We can view this prediction problem as a game played against
nature, where at the beginning of the game Nature picks a data sequence
and the forecaster picks a forecasting algorithm. If the forecaster is not
allowed to randomize, then Nature win; there will always be data for which
the forecaster does poorly. This paper shows that, if the forecaster can
randomize, the forecaster wins in the sense that the forecasted probabilities
and the empirical probabilities can be made arbitrarily close to each other.
Some keywords: Brier Score; Calibration; Competitive ratio; Regret; Uni-
versal prediction of sequences; Worst case.
1 Introduction
Probability forecasting is the act of assigning probabilities to an uncertain
event. It is an activity widely practised in meteorological circles. For exam-
ple, since 1965, the U.S. National Weather Service has been in the habit of
making and announcing probability of precipitation (PoP) forecasts. Such a
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forecast is interpreted to be the probability that precipitation, defined to be
at least 0.01 inches, will occur in a specified time period and area. These PoP
forecasts are now popularly accepted by the American public as meaningful
and informative.
There are many criteria for judging the effectiveness of a probability fore-
cast (Murphy and Epstein, 1967). In this paper we limit ourselves to the
consideration of calibration, sometimes termed reliability. Dawid (1982) of-
fers the following intuitive definition of calibration:
“Suppose that, in a long (conceptually infinite) sequence of weather
forecasts, we look at all those days for which the forecast proba-
bility of precipitation was, say, close to some given value ω and
(assuming these form an infinite sequence) determine the long run
proportion p of such days on which the forecast event (rain) in
fact occurred. The plot of p against ω is termed the forecaster’s
empirical calibration curve. If the curve is the diagonal p = ω,
the forecaster may be termed (empirically) well calibrated.”
We give a rigorous definition later.
Calibration by itself is not a sufficient condition for a forecast to be
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deemed good. To see this, suppose there are two weather forecasters facing
the following weather sequence: dry, wet, dry, wet,. . .. One always forecasts a
probability of 1/2 of rain each day and the other alternates 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .. Both
forecasters are well calibrated, but the forecasts of the first are clearly less
useful than those of the second. Now consider two uncalibrated forecasts, the
first of which always forecasts a probability of 1/3 and the second of which
alternates 1, 0, 1, 0, . . ., always generating an incorrect forecast. Which of
these two is better is a matter of debate; the first has a lower quadratic error
but the second gets the ‘pattern’ of rain correct. Both seem dominated by
the two forecasts discussed previously. Thus, calibration does seem to be an
appealing minimal property that any probability forecast should satisfy.
The notion of calibration only makes sense if one can construct forecasts
that are calibrated. Regrettably, Oakes (1985) has proved that no deter-
ministic forecasting sequence can be calibrated for all possible sequences, see
Dawid (1985) for a different proof. Specifically, Oakes shows that it is impos-
sible to construct a joint distribution for an infinite sequence of events whose
posterior mean is guaranteed to be calibrated for every possible sequence of
outcomes.
A way around this impossibility result is to relax the requirement that a
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forecast be calibrated against all possible sequences. Perhaps it is sufficient
that the forecaster be calibrated for some restricted family of distributions.
Dawid (1985) argues that this can result in forecasting schemes that are
computationally burdensome and in some cases not computable at all. Al-
ternatively, one can reject the notion that calibration is a desirable or useful
notion at all. Schervish (1985), for example, offers two arguments for this
view. The first is that calibration is a long run criterion: in the short run
(when we are alive) a forecaster may do quite well. The second is that while
a malevolent Nature may be able to make one forecaster look bad according
to the calibration criterion, its harder for her to make many forecasters look
bad at the same time.
Our goal in this paper is to rescue the notion of calibration. We get
around the impossibility result of Oakes by broadening the definition of cali-
bration to include randomized forecasts. By carefully choosing our definition
of calibration for randomized forecast, we show how to construct a forecast
which is in fact approximately calibrated. Finally, we generalize our results
to the case when what is being forecast is a distribution, not just a point.
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2 Notation and Definitions
For ease of exposition assume our forecasting method, F , is assigned the
task of forecasting the probability of two states of nature, wet or dry. The
main result holds for more than 2 states. The proof is the same, just more
notation. Denote by Xt the outcome in period t: Xt = 1 if it is wet and
Xt = 0 if it is dry. Denote by X
T the sequence of wet and dry days up to
and including period T . Since we can interpret XT to be the first T terms
of an infinite sequence X∞ that has been revealed to us, we will, when there
is no ambiguity, write X for XT .
In our context a forecasting method is simply a function that associates
with any binary sequence, from the space of all binary sequences, a unique
number in the interval [0, 1]. A randomized forecasting method would asso-
ciate with each binary sequence a probability distribution over [0, 1] which
governs the selection of a number in [0, 1]. The forecast that F makes in
period t will be denoted by ft = F (X
t−1). Let nT (p;F,X) be the number of
times F forecasts p up to time T . Let ρT (p;X,F ) be the fraction of those
times that it actually rained. That is,
nT (p;F,X) ≡
T∑
t=1
Ift=p
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ρT (p;F,X) ≡
T∑
t=1
Ift=pXt
nt(p)
,
where I is the indicator function. In the original definition of calibration it
was assumed that F was restricted to selecting forecasts from a finite set,
A, fixed a priori. One definition of calibration is the following: F is well
calibrated with respect to X if and only if, for each p ∈ A,
lim
t→∞
ρt(p;X,F ) = p.
Another definition is based on the calibration component of the Brier score
(Brier (1950), Murphy (1972, 1973). See Blattenberger and Lad (1985) for
an exposition. To introduce this definition, let the calibration score of F
with respect to X after n periods be denoted by Ct(F,X) where
Ct(F,X) =
∑
p∈A
{ρt(p;X,F )− p}2
nt(p;F,X)
t
.
Thus, F is well calibrated with respect to X if an only if Ct(F,X) goes to
zero as t goes to infinity.
The requirement that F select from a fixed set A is not a severe restriction
for practical purposes. Many weather forecasters forecast probabilities to
only one decimal place.
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3 Rules of the game
So that the assumptions underlying our analysis are clear, we frame the
analysis in terms of a repeated game between two players. One is the statis-
tician (he) making the probability forecasts and the other is Nature (she)
who chooses the outcomes. Nature picks the data X and the statistician
picks the forecast function F . The payment from the statistician to Nature
after t rounds of play is Ct(F,X). The statistician would like to play so that
Ct(F,X) is vanishingly small in the limit. In the case when the statistician
employs a randomized forecasting rule, the goal is to make Ct(F,X) vanish-
ingly small in some probabilistic sense, which we will specify later. For the
moment, if the statistician succeeds in making Ct(F,X) vanishingly small in
an appropriate sense, we will say that he wins the game.
Whether or not the statistician can win the game depends on his fore-
casting scheme as well as the power of his adversary, Nature. We describe a
number of different assumptions about the power of the adversary.
Prescient Adversary: In this scenario Nature knows the forecast that
the statistician will make on each round before she chooses the next element
of the sequence, ‘rain’ or ‘shine’. It is impossible for the statistician to
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win the game under these conditions, (Oakes, 1985). To see why, suppose
the statistician uses some deterministic forecasting scheme F . Consider the
following procedure for generating a sequence X (Dawid, 1985):
Xt =

1 if in period i the forecaster predicts a probability ≤ 0.5
0 otherwise.
A straightforward calculation establishes that Ct(F,X) ≥ 1/4 for all deter-
ministic forecasting methods F . The case of equality occurs when F is the
forecast that generates ft = 1/2 for all i.
It makes no difference if the statistician employs a randomized forecasting
scheme. Since Nature knows the forecast before she moves, this is essentially
equivalent to the deterministic set up once we have conditioned on the ran-
domization.
If the statistician’s payoff orloss function is changed, for example if the
Brier Score is used instead of the calibration score, then the statistician can
win at this game against a prescient adversary (Foster, 1991; Littlestone
and Warmuth, 1994; Vovk, 1990; Feder, Mehrav and Gutman, 1992; Cover,
1991).
Oblivious Adversary: In this scenario Nature knows only the forecast-
ing scheme that will be used by the statistician. Nature then picks the entire
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sequence at the start of the game. In the case when the statistician uses a
deterministic forecasting scheme, there is no difference between the oblivious
and prescient adversary. Nature need only run the statistician’s forecasting
algorithm to work out what he will predict on each round. When the statisti-
cian uses a randomized forecast, however, picking the sequence at the start of
the game means that Nature will not know the results of the randomization
on each round, although she knows the distribution over the different fore-
casts that the statistician will use. It will follow as an immediate corollary of
the main result that the statistician can win against an oblivious adversary.
Results for other kinds of loss functions can be found in Foster and Vohra
(1993).
Adaptive Adversary: In this scenario Nature will know the forecasting
rule used by the statistician. If the statistician uses a deterministic forecast,
Nature will be able to work out the forecast that will be generated before
she moves. If the forecast used is a randomized one, Nature will know the
distribution over the possible forecasts before she moves but not the actual
realization. Unlike the oblivious adversary, Nature is not restricted to choos-
ing the entire sequence at the start of the game. She can condition on the
previous plays that the statistician has made. Thus, as time goes on, Nature
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can learn more about what the statistician’s behaviour is, but the statistician
can still randomize on the next move so that Nature does not know exactly
what he will do.
There are two equivalent ways of viewing the strategies used by the statis-
tician against an adaptive adversary. The first is to allow the statistician to
randomize only before the first move. In other words, he picks a single fore-
casting scheme at random. Alternatively, he is allowed to randomize on each
successive round. Assuming that Nature can only observe the actions taken
by the statistician and not the actual randomization, these two variations
are equivalent. It is the second view we adopt in this paper.
The adaptive adversary appears to be less powerful than the prescient one,
and this is a weakness on which the statistician can capitalize on. Consider
the randomized forecasting strategy defined as follows:
ft =

2/3 with probability 2/3 if Xt−1 = 1
1/3 with probability 1/3 if Xt−1 = 1
2/3 with probability 1/3 if Xt−1 = 0
1/3 with probability 2/3 if Xt−1 = 0
For this particular strategy one can establish after tedious calculations that
max
X
Ct(F,X) = 2/9 + op(1), where op(1) tends to zero in probability as
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n tends to infinity. Hence, minF maxX Ct(F,X) < 1/4, with probability
tending to 1. By randomizing in this way we are implicitly operating two
forecasting strategies instead of one. Thus, Nature finds it harder to miscal-
ibrate F . The rest of this paper will show how to improve this 2/9 + op(1)
down to op(1).
In this paper we assume that Nature is an adaptive adversary.1 Here is a
precise statement of the rules we will follow:
1. The statistician begins by choosing a randomized forecasting method or
function F and reveals only the distribution of this forecast to Nature.
2. In period t ≥ 1, the statistician generates ft(= F (X t−1)), and, simulta-
neously, Nature selects the value of Xt. Nature knows the distribution
of strategies that the statistician will use, but not the actual value of
the randomization.
3. The penalty the statistician incurs after t rounds is Ct(F,X).
Alternatively, we can state our goal without recourse to using a game-
theoretic model. The object is to find an F that is, ε-calibrated, according
1Freund and Schapire (1995) discuss the relationship between the adaptive and oblivi-
ous adversary.
12
to the following definition.
Definition (ε-Calibration) A randomized forecast rule F is ε-calibrated
if, for all X,
lim
t→∞
pr{Ct(F,X) < ε} > 1− ε.
Note that X is allowed to be a stochastic process that may depend on the
previous realizations of the F ’s and X’s.
Within the context of a game, the existence of an F that is ε-calibrated
is implied by showing that minF maxX E[Ct(F,X)] is less than ε
2 for all t
sufficiently large, where the expectations are over the distributions chosen by
Nature and by the statistician. The proof is via Jensen’s inequality:
min
F
max
X
P [Ct(F,X) > ε] ≤ min
F
max
X
E[Ct(F,X)]/ε = ε.
Likewise, if an F exists which is ε-calibrated then our security level is less
than 2ε. Since both of these can be shown to go to zero, they are equivalent
statements.
4 An Argument of Sergiu Hart
Some readers of earlier versions of this paper have derived alternative proofs
of the main result. Among these is the following elegant but non-constructive
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argument of Sergiu Hart for the existence of a winning strategy for the statis-
tician.
The proof constructs a zero-sum game played between the statistician and
Nature. Each will have a finite number of strategies and so the mini-max
theorem will hold. Fix at n the number of times to be forecast. In order
that the statistician’s strategy space is finite, we restrict him to picking one
of the following as a forecast: 0, 1/k, 2/k, . . ., 1. Here k is some sufficiently
large integer that will be chosen later. A pure strategy for the statistician
consists of an n-vector of such forecasts. Thus his strategy space consists of
(k + 1)2
n−1 pure strategies. Nature’s strategy space is then the set of all 2n
binary strings.2
Now suppose that Nature has to pick her strategy first. To achieve her
minimax value she will randomize among her choice of pure strategies. We
can now assume that the statistician knows the randomization policy that
Nature will follow. To use the minimax theorem we now need to specify a
strategy for the statistician which will keep his loss below ε. If we can do
2Technically, Nature has 2n strategies only if we assume that Nature is an oblivious
adversary. If Nature is an adaptive adversary, her strategy space is much larger since her
strategy in each round can depend on what she saw in the previous rounds. In this case
she has 2
(k+1)n−1
k strategies. Nevertheless, the argument is the same.
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this for all possible strategies of Nature then there must exist a strategy for
the statistician which will guarantee him a loss below ε.
How should the statistician behave if he knows what random policy Na-
ture will follow? At each point in time he can compute the conditional
probability of the next item in the sequence. He can then round this prob-
ability to the nearest i/k value, which he then forecasts. If we assume that
k is much less than n1/3, his calibration score will be less than 1/k with
high probability. Here is an outline of why this must be so. The forecaster’s
calibration score is
Ct(F,X) =
k∑
j=0
{ρt(j/k;X,F )− j/k}2
nt(j/k;F,X)
t
.
Now consider all the times on which the statistician forecast j/k. He did so
because the probability that Nature would pick a 1 on that round was some
number q such that |q − j/k| ≤ 1/2k. By a law of large numbers type of
argument we would expect then that |ρt(j/k;X,F )− j/k| ≤ 1/2k. Hence
Ct(F,X) ≤
k∑
j=0
(1/k)2
nt(j/k;F,X)
t
= O(1/k).
Thus there exists a strategy which will guarantee him a win. The drawback
is that determination of the strategy is impractical in that it requires the
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solution of an enormous linear program. In the next section we describe a
different and more efficient way of constructing an ε-calibrated forecast.
5 Constructing an ε-Calibrated Forecast
In this section we describe a forecasting algorithm that we subsequently show
to be ε-calibrated.
In round t the algorithm randomly selects one element from the set
A = {0, 1
k
, 2
k
,. . .,k−1
k
, 1} according to the distribution µt. We shall find a
distribution µt over the set A such that the random forecast F which fore-
casts ft =
i
k
with probability µit will be ε-calibrated. These µ
i
t may be history
dependent.
First define the Expected Brier Score for a randomized forecast, to be
EBSt(F,X) ≡
t∑
s=0
k∑
i=0
µis(Xs − ik )
2
t
This score is averaged over the randomization of the forecast (i.e. µt) but not
over the data X, making it a “prequential expectation” ( Dawid 1984, 1993).
Define a new random forecast F i→j to be exactly the same as F except that
whenever F makes a forecast of i
k
, F i→j makes a forecast of j
k
. It might
happen that F i→j has a lower expected Brier score than F and hence it is
16
a better forecast than F . When this happens, the difference in their Brier
scores is called the regret of changing i
k
to j
k
.
Definition (Regret) Define the regret of changing i
k
to j
k
to be:
Ri→jt ≡ t{EBSt(F,X)− EBSt(F i→j, X)}+,
where (x)+ is the positive part of x. In other words, if we define Sijt to be the
signed difference in the Brier score, namely,
Sijt =
t∑
s=1
µis
(
Xs − ik
)2
−
t∑
s=1
µis
(
Xs − jk
)2
, (1)
then the regret from changing i
k
to j
k
is:
Ri→jt =

Sijt if S
ij
t > 0
0 otherwise
In Theorem 3 we show that the calibration score of F is closely related
to the maximal regret: in particular,
Ct(F,X) =
∑
i
max
j
Ri→jt
t
+O(1/k2).
We pick our distribution µt so that it satisfies the following conservation
condition for all i:
∑
j 6=i
µjtR
j→i
t−1 = µ
i
t
∑
j 6=i
Ri→jt−1 . (2)
Theorem 1 A randomized forecast using the µt defined by equation (2) with
k ≈ 1/ε2 is an ε-calibrated forecast.
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We prove this theorem in the next section. The remainder of this section
is devoted to showing that the algorithm is well defined. For convenience we
supress the dependence on t. Let A be a matrix with elements
aij = R
j→i (3)
for all i 6= j, and
aii = −
∑
j 6=i
Ri→j. (4)
Note that the row sums of A are all zero. Equation (2) is equivalent to
Ax = 0. We need to show that system Ax = 0 admits a non-trivial and
non-negative solution, which can be normalized to turn it into a probability
vector.
Let A′ be the matrix with elements a′ij = aij/B, where B = maxi,j |aij|.
Note that |a′ij| ≤ 1 and
∑
i a
′
ij = 0. Let P = A
′ + I. Then, P will be a non-
negative row-stochastic matrix. Hence there is a non-negative probability
vector x such that Px = x: since we do not require that x be unique, we do
not need any restrictions on the matrix P . Since P = A′+ I we deduce that
A′x+ Ix = x ⇒ A′x = 0 ⇒ Ax = 0
The vector x gives the required distribution, and, it can easily be found by
Gaussian elimination.
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6 Proof that the algorithm works
As F is essentially fixed, we can for convenience suppress the dependence on
F in our notation. We write nt(p), ρt(p) and Ct for nt(p;F,X), ρt(p;F,X)
and Ct(F,X) respectively. The proof divides into two steps. In the first
step we show that Ct can be closely approximated by something akin to its
average value. To this end define modified versions of n, ρ and C as given in
Table 1.
Base definitions Modified definitions
nt(
i
k
) ≡
t∑
s=1
I
ft=
i
k
ñt(
i
k
) ≡
t∑
s=1
µis
ρt(
i
k
) ≡
t∑
s=1
I
f̂t=
i
k
Xs
nt(
i
k
)
ρ̃t(
i
k
) ≡
t∑
s=1
µisXs
ñt(
i
k
)
Ct ≡
k∑
j=0
nt(
j
k
)
t
(
ρt(
j
k
)− j
k
)2
C̃t ≡
k∑
j=0
ñt(
j
k
)
t
(
ρ̃t(
j
k
)− j
k
)2
TABLE 1
Note that nt(
i
k
) − ñt( ik ), and ρt(
i
k
)nt(
i
k
) − ρ̃t( ik )ñt(
i
k
) are both martingales.
This allows us to approximate Ct by C̃t, as follows
Theorem 2 Ct − C̃t → 0 in probability as t→∞.
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Proof: The function C(·), defined by
C(a0, a1, . . . , ak, b0, b1, . . . , bk) =
k∑
j=0
aj
(
bj
aj
− j
k
)2
is a continuous function over the compact set 0 ≤ bi ≤ ai ≤ 1, it is uniformly
continuous. We can rewrite Ct and C̃t as
Ct = C
(
nt(0)
t
,
nt(
1
k
)
t
, . . . ,
nt(1)
t
,
ρt(0)nt(0)
t
,
ρt(
1
k
)nt(
1
k
)
t
, . . . ,
ρt(1)nt(1)
t
)
C̃t = C
(
ñt(0)
t
,
ñt(
1
k
)
t
, . . . ,
ñt(1)
t
,
ρ̃t(0)ñt(0)
t
,
ρ̃t(
1
k
)ñt(
1
k
)
t
, . . . ,
ρ̃t(1)ñt(1)
t
)
.
It is sufficient to show that the differences in the arguments converge to zero
in order to establish that Ct − C̃t converges to zero.
Since nt(
i
k
) − ñt( ik ), and ρt(
i
k
)nt(
i
k
) − ρ̃t( ik )ñt(
i
k
) are both counting pro-
cesses, their jumps are bounded by 1, and hence the variance of the jumps
are trivially bounded by 1. In other words,
var[{nt( ik )− ñt(
i
k
)} − {nt−1( ik )− ñt−1(
i
k
)}] ≤ 1
var[{ρt( ik )nt(
i
k
)− ρ̃t( ik )ñt(
i
k
)} − {ρt−1( ik )nt−1(
i
k
)− ρ̃t−1( ik )ñt−1(
i
k
)}] ≤ 1,
which leads to
var{
nt(
i
k
)− ñt( ik )
t
} ≤ 1/t
var{
ρt(
i
k
)nt(
i
k
)− ρ̃t( ik )ñt(
i
k
)
t
} ≤ 1/t.
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Since L2 convergence implies convergence in probability, we see that Ct −
C̃t → 0 in probability. If almost sure convergence is desired, it will follow
from a similar argument using 4th moments. 2
In the second step we show that this ‘average’ calibration score goes to
zero with t. This is done by using the regret to bound the average calibration
score and then proving that the regret is asymptotically small. There is a
technical difficulty to be overcome. Regret as we have defined it is a function
of the form max{x, 0}, giving it a ‘kink’ at zero. To smooth away this
kink we introduce a function gδ that is differentiable at 0 and approximates
max{x, 0}.
Define
R̃δt ≡
∑
i,j
gδ(R
i→j
t ),
where
gδ(x) ≡

δx2
2
x ≥ 0
0 x ≤ 0.
(5)
Note that gδ(R
i→j
t ) = gδ(S
ij
t ), where S
ij
t is defined by equation (1).
Theorem 3 The calibration score is related to the regret by
∑
i
max
j
Ri→j ≤ tC̃t ≤
∑
i
max
j
Ri→j +
t
4k2
≤ R̃δt +
k
2δ
+
t
4k2
.
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Proof: First note that
Sijt =
2(j − i)
k
t∑
s=1
µis
(
Xs −
i
k
+ j
k
2
)
=
2(j − k)ñt( ik )
k
(
ρ̃t(
i
k
)−
i
k
+ j
k
2
)
= ñt(
i
k
){ρ̃t( ik )−
i
k
}2 − ñt( ik ){ρ̃t(
i
k
)− j
k
}2.
Thus,
ñt(
i
k
){ρ̃t( ik )−
i
k
}2 = Sijt + ñt( ik ){ρ̃t(
i
k
)− j
k
}2
≥ Sijt ≥ max
j
Sijt = max
j
Ri→jt .
Now summing over both sides provides the first inequality.
For the second inequality observe that the maximum regret occurs at the
point where ñt(
i
k
){ρ̃t( ik )−
j
k
}2 is smallest. Thus
ñt(
i
k
){ρ̃t( ik )−
i
k
}2 = max
j
(
Sijt
)
+ min
j
ñt(
i
k
){ρ̃t( ik )−
j
k
}2
≤ max
j
(
Sijt
)
+
ñt(
i
k
)
4k2
.
Summing over i provides the second inequality.
Since 1/(2δ) + gδ(x) ≥ x we see that
max
j
Ri→j ≤ 1
2δ
+ max
j
gδ(R
i→j) ≤ 1
2δ
+
∑
j
gδ(R
i→j),
and summing over i leads to the last inequality. 2
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Theorem 4 For the µt defined in equation (2), R̃
δ
t ≤ tkδ
Proof: Note that gδ(x+α)− gδ(x) ≤ δα(x)+ + δα2. Define Ljt ≡ (Xt− jk )
2,
so that Sijt = S
ij
t−1 + µ
i
t(L
j
t − Lit). Since,
gδ(S
ij
t )− gδ(Sijt−1) ≤ δµit(L
j
t − Lit)R
i→j
t−1 + δ(µ
i
t)
2(Ljt − Lit)2
we obtain:
R̃δt − R̃δt−1 =
∑
i,j
{
gδ(S
ij
t )− gδ(Sijt−1)
}
≤ δ
∑
i,j
{
µitL
i
t − µitL
j
t
}
Ri→jt−1 +
{
µitL
i
t − µitL
j
t
}2
.
¿From equation (2) we see that
∑
i,j:i 6=j
{
µitL
i
t − µitL
j
t
}
Ri→jt−1 =
∑
i
Lit
∑
j
µitR
i→j
t−1 − µ
j
tR
j→i
t−1
 = 0,
where the equality follows by interchanging the dummy arguments i and j.
Thus,
R̃δt − R̃δt−1 ≤ δ
∑
i,j
{
µitL
i
t − µitL
j
t
}2
≤ δ
∑
i,j
(µit)
2 = δk
∑
i
(µit)
2
≤ δk,
which gives R̃δt − R̃δ0 ≤ tkδ. However, we know that R̃δ0 = 0 so that R̃δt ≤ tkδ.
2
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Combining Theorems 1-4 yields the following obvious but technical corol-
lary.
Corollary For all ε > 0, if k > ε−1/2 and t0 > 8k
2/(ε), then, for all t ≥ t0
we have that C̃t ≤ ε. Further, there exists a t1 > t0 such that for all t ≥ t1,
pr(Ct < ε) ≥ 1− ε.
With care, ε can be chosen to be O(t
−1/3
0 ). Theorem 1 now follows directly
from this corollary.
Theorem 1 can be strengthened to almost sure convergence. We sketch
the argument here. First run a 2−i-calibrated algorithm for a ‘long time’
and then switch to a 2−(i+1)-calibrated algorithm. Repeat indefinitely. The
hard part is defining what a ‘long time’ means. It must be sufficiently long
such that each stage has a probability of at most 2−i of ever being above
2−(i−1). It also must be sufficiently long that we can amortize the ‘phase in’
period of the 2−(i+i)-calibrated algorithm. Combining this with the almost
sure version of Theorem 2 yields a non-constructive proof of the existence of
an algorithm such that Ct → 0 almost surely.
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7 Forecasting With Distributions
Suppose that, instead of making a point forecast ft of the probability that
Xt = 1, we forecast a distribution µt(). For example, suppose some sort of
hierarchical model is considered such that there is a parameter pt for each
time t. Then we could think of a posterior for pt, i.e. a distributional forecast
of a binary event. Clearly, the definition of calibration must be generalized
if it is to be applied to a distributional forecast. A reasonable definition of
ρt() is
ρt(p;X) =
∑
s≤t
dµs(p)Xs∑
s≤t
dµs(p)
.
Hence, if µ is a distributional forecast, its calibration with respect to X after
n periods is
CT (µ,X) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∫ 1
0
{ρt(p)− p}2dµt(p).
Note that, if the distributional forecast is a degenerate one, i.e. a point
forecast, the definition of calibration reduces to the one given earlier in the
paper. Given what we know about deterministic point forecasts, we can
assert that some distributional forecasts are not calibrated.
Any randomized point forecast can be viewed as a distributional forecast.
If this is done, the calibration score is exactly C̃t, as defined in section 6.
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Simply treat the randomization at each period as the distribution being fore-
cast. In this case the calibration of the distributional forecast is a number,
in contrast to the calibration of the associated randomized point forecast,
which is a random variable. This observation yields the following corollary
to Theorems 1-3.
Corollary There is a distributional forecast µ() such that, for all X and
ε > 0, Ct(µ,X) ≤ ε for all t sufficiently large.
If we think of µt() as a posterior distribution for pr(Xt = 1), then we can
combine Oakes’ (1985) result with the corollary to conclude that a posterior
mean might not be calibrated for all X but that there are some posterior
distributions that are always calibrated. Thus, in terms of calibration, the
posterior distribution is a better statistic than the posterior mean.
8 Discussion
Our goal in this paper has been to rescue the notion of calibration. We
have done this by generalizing the original definition of calibration offered by
Dawid to allow for randomized forecasts. Further, we have shown that this
weakened definition is not vacuous, by exhibiting a forecasting scheme that
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satisfies it.
The scheme we propose, while ε-calibrated, achieves this at the cost of
a higher Brier score. To see why, consider the forecast that at each round
forecasts
∑k
j=1 µ
j
t . By the convexity of the Brier score, this forecast will have
a Brier score that is smaller than the expected Brier score of the randomized
forecast that uses the distribution µt.
While this paper was under review a number of other researchers have
been moved to find alternative proofs of our main result. One of these ap-
proaches, due to Sergiu Hart, we have already described. A constructive
version of Hart’s proof has been derived independently by Drew Fudenberg
and David Levine. They view each step to be forecast as a game and then
use the minimax theorem to compute the value of that step. Sergiu Hart
and Andreu Mas-Colell have recently shown that our Theorem 4 is a corol-
lary of David Blackwell’s (1956) approachability theorem and so provide an
alternative proof that our algorithm will in fact be ε-calibrated.
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